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There are many definitions of foreign policy, for some, it is a rela¬ 
tively consistent coarse of conduct pursued by a state over an appreciable 
period in its relations with other states,^ others say it consists in 
bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, 
2 a nation's commitments and power. But the definition of foreign policy 
which will be used in this work is that foreign policy is the governmental 
conduct of the relations of one political sovereignty with others.^ 
Now, from these definitions, we see that foreign policy is a plan, a 
course of conduct of a sovereign state. However, this pattern of behavior 
is formulated and executed by the President, his aides, the State Depart¬ 
ment, and other institutions. Congress, to be sure, does play an important 
role in the foreign policy process.^ However, the basic responsibility of 
the United States foreign policy rests with the President. "The adminis¬ 
tration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations 
of the body politics, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary, but in 
its most usual and perhaps in its post precise signification, it is limit¬ 
ed to executive details and falls peculiarly within the province of the 
1-Edward cV Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics 
(New York, 1956), p. 162. 
fyalter Lippmann, U. S. foreign Policyt Shield of foe Republic (Boston. 
19U3), P. 9.    
3Felix Morley, The foreign Policy of foe United States (New York, 1951)» 
p. 7. 
^Article I, Section 8, gives Congress power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations. Article U, Section 2, gives the Senate the power to rati¬ 
fy treaties and confirm the appointment of foreign service officers. 
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executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, ....con¬ 
stitutes what seems to be most properly understood by the administration 
of government. 
The President of the United States is, nominally speaking, the primary 
initiator of foreigi policy, although, many of his policies are derived 
from other sources! Congress, public opinion, or the State Department. The 
President, throughout the history of America, has been responsible for 
broad foreign policies. Washington, in 1793» proclaimed American neutral¬ 
ity and in his "Fare-well Address* warned political leaders against polit¬ 
ical entanglements with Europe. This set the pattern fbr isolationism. 
In 1823, Monroe, in a speech to Congress, voiced certain principles con¬ 
cerning foreign political activities in the Western Hemisphere; this, too, 
developed into one of America*s outstanding foreign policies. In 1899, the 
"Open Door" policy was instigated under Tyler and became a foundation stone 
for America's dealing with the Par East. Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and 
Wilson brought a number of Caribbean republics under the supervision of 
America. It was the neutrality policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which 
finally was abandoned, that led America during the earlier stages of World 
War II. It was Franklin D. Roosevelt's agreement with Prime Minister 
Churchill in the Atlantic Charter of 191*1, which set some of the post-war 
goals of America .and her allies. Finally, it was Truman's speech to Con¬ 
gress, March 12, 19l*7, which enunciated the famous "Truman Doctrine.*^ 
^Edward Mead EarlefThe Federalist (New York, 1937)» p. 1*86. 
^Samuel Flagg Bends, The United States As A World Power (New York, 
1955), PP. 185-192. 
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These examples could be multiplied endlessly, but in keeping with our pur¬ 
pose we stop with the “Truman Doctrine." 
From the above statements it may appear that the President is the sole 
instigator of foreign policy. His authority is broad but there are con¬ 
trols by which this authority is exercised. Other than executive agree¬ 
ments, any foreign policy enunciated by the President generally is submit¬ 
ted to Congress. Tb be executed it will need money, if not for the policy 
itself, then fbr the means of execution. Congress must appropriate the 
money. Also, Congress declares war and the Senate confirms foreign service 
7 
appointments, and ratifies treaties. However, in-spite of these institu¬ 
tional checks, the President has special and immense powers, not the least 
of which is derived from his position as commander-in-chief. 
Recently, America has developed a new concept in foreign policy, one 
which seems to some to modify the words of Jefferson, that "in every free 
and deliberating society there must, from the nature of man, be opposite 
8 
parties, and violent discussions and discords." This new concept was 
o 
born of America* s need to meet the threats of war. Later, as a result of 
this concept, America was able to execute the war more expeditiously, to 
make ready and present purposeful post-war plans, and to avoid the fate 
of Wilson following World War 
^George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress (New Tork, 
1955), p. liiJU. 
®Blair Bo lies, “Bipartisanship In American Foreign Policy,* Foreign 
Policy ReportsfXXIV (January, 19U9), p* 192 
^Blair Bolies, ibid., p. 195» 
iPl t is argued by some that had Wilson allowed opposite party members 
to participate - the Versailles Treaty would have been ratified. 
k 
This new concept» which really describes a process» seems illusive to 
many,^1 but it is supported by evidence of inter-party cooperation. Bi¬ 
partisanship means more than the process of informing members of the oppos- 
12 
in g party. Bipartisanship has multiple aspects! consultation between 
the Executive Branch and opposing party leaders» exclusion of certain issues 
from presidential campaigns, general support of policies after debate and 
decisions, inter-party considerations in reaching agreements» and appoint¬ 
ment of minority party members to responsible policy making roles.^3 In 
a very real sense, operationally speaking, bipartisanship in foreign policy 
is a loose, extra-constitutional alliance or modus operand! between the 
administration and a few key leaders of the opposition party in Congress 
and elsewhere for the purpose of securing and maintaining unity of thought 
and action in our relations with other states.^ 
As this work unfolds, the multiple aspects of bipartisanship will 
emerge; its definition is operational and assumes form only as a certain 
^Senators* Taft, Wherry, Brewster, and others of the Old Guard of 
the Republican Party. 
l^Edgar s. ïUmiss, Jr. and Richard C. Snyder, An Introduction to 
American foreign Policy (New fork, 1955)* P* 21?. 
^3pichard C. Snyder and Edgar S. FUmiss, American foreign Policy 
(New fork, 195U), pp. 1*77-500. 
U*George H. E. Smith- "Bipartisan foreign policy is at best, a loose 
alliance between the adninistration and a few prominent leaders of a 
section of the Republican Party for the purpose of reaching common action 
on selected undertakings in foreign affairs." This définition obviously 
is dated, since it was enunciated when the Democrats controlled the admin¬ 
istration. However, the transfer of executive power to the Republican 
Party does not affect the principle involved. Quoted in George B. Galloway, 
op>. çit., p. 190. 
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process develops. Therefore, bipartisanship in foreigp policy for this 
study means inter-party cooperation. This inter-party cooperation may 
be expressed in various ways* it may be cooperation between the party in 
control of the Executive Branch and the opposing party, the appointment 
of minority party members to key policy making committees or conferences, 
or simply the consultation with the minority partir after a certain policy 
has been instigated. 
In addition, there are several other aspects of bipartisanships patri¬ 
otism, cooperation, compromise, and the practice of the Executive Depart¬ 
ment to rely upon bipartisan procedure where foreign policy must be legis¬ 
lated. First, patriotism is the feeling that above all parties is the 
nation; the idea that national unity is more important than party advan¬ 
tage in time of war or crisis; the desire to present a united front to the 
world in a perilous period of history.*'* Secondly, cooperation strengthens 
the President in the conduct of foreign policy by adding to his influence 
both at home and abroad. Because of weak party discipline, the President 
may need minority support to carry out foreign policy.*** A striking exam¬ 
ple of the potential peril of partisanship occurred in the struggle over 
the European Recovery Program during the 80th Congress. The ERP was strong¬ 
ly opposed by chairman Taber of the House Appropriations Committee, a veter¬ 
an economizer, who led the move to reduce finds for the Marshall Plan. How¬ 
ever, leaders of both houses and both political parties loyally backed the 
^George B. Galloway, ©£. dt., p. 191. 
l6Blai P BoÜ0Sj op» dt»§ p* 193e 
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so-called bipartisan foreign policy in the belief that it would promote 
national security and make for consistency and stability in foreign re¬ 
lations.1^ Thirdly, according to one writer, compromise is the key to 
bipartisanship. It the price of Republican support, the Democratic Admin- 
l8 istration has had to accept propositions distasteful to it. Republicans, 
in Congress, virtually re-wrote the Marshall Plan and at the suggestion of 
Senator Vandenberg refused to intrust the plan to the State Department. 
Instead, a new agency was created - the Economic Co-operation Administration. 
At the suggestion of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the ECA was di¬ 
rected to administer economic aid to China, this was also in opposition to 
the desire of the State Department. The Republicans also wrote into law 
the provision that 25 per cent of wheat exported through EGA financing must 
go in the form of flour and 50 per cent of goods sent abroad under the 
Marshall Plan be shipped in American flag vessels, finally, too, is the 
practice of the Executive Department to lean on bipartisan procedure where 
policy depends on legislation. The Executive Department did not consult 
Republican representatives in Congress concerning its policy towards Pales¬ 
tine, China, and Japan. And the administration remained independent of 
19 the Republican Parly in its economic policy towards the American Republics. 
However, another writer states that agreement is lacking as to the char¬ 
acter of a truly bipartisan policy. There is no agreement as to the insti¬ 
tutional implementation required for bipartisan policy, finally, he states, 
^George B. Galloway, o£. cit., p. 191* 
l^At the time of this article, the Democrats controlled the adminis¬ 
tration. 
l^Blair Bo lies, oj>. cit.. p, 19lu 
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there has been no real codification of the rights and duties appropriate 
to the majority and minority parties*^0 
Despite the disagreements, there is a threefold common core of agree¬ 
ments first, bipartisanship is expressed in a sharing of power and re¬ 
sponsibilities between the major parties and between the executive and 
legislative branches when they are controlled by different parties. Second, 
the aim of bipartisanship is a maximum harmony, unity, and consistency in 
foreign policy. Third, the basis of harmony, unity and consistency is agree- 
21 ment on fundamental principles and objectives. 
Bipartisanship, as stated previously, is a new concept in American 
foreign policy. Consequently, the purpose of this work is to explain its 
origin, nature, and evolution. It will be maintained that bipartisanship 
was the primary condition of America's avoidance of the tragic errors of 
Wilson following World War I and it contributed to America's participation 
in the United Nations. Secondly, bipartisanship enabled America to set 
forth vital plane fbr prosecuting the war and laid the ground-work for post¬ 
war policies. 
A combination of the historical and analytical methods will be used in 
this study. It will start at the outset of World War H and trace biparti¬ 
sanship in fbreign policy to the beginning of the Korean Conflict. 
2 Orchard c. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American ?breign Policy 
(New York, 195k), p. 501. 
21 
Ibid., p. 501. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SETTING 
"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign 
nations is, in expanding our commercial relations, to have 
with them as little political connections as possible  
Europe has a set of primary interest which to us have none 
or a very remote relation* Hence, she must be engaged in 
frequent controversies, the cause of which are essentially 
foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be un¬ 
wise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the 
ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary com¬ 
binations and collisions of her friendships of «unities... 
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances 
with any portion of the foreign world. 
These are the words of Washington in his * Pare-well Address** and this 
advice established one of America's outstanding foreign policies — Isola¬ 
tionism. Until recently, this was, in a measure, the official plan of the 
United States towards Europe. How, isolationism is based on the alleged 
2 
self-sufficiency and immunity from attack of the United States. it means, 
further, that America assumed an attitude of aloofoess in international 
politics, especially towards Europe. Isolationism, too, has been defined 
as a predicament and not a theory or a theory about a theory.^ following 
this policy, the United States withdrew from the European Continent follow¬ 
ing World War I. This left a vast vacuum which at that time, no European 
nation could fill. Soon this vacuum was filled by the dictators of Europe. 
By their will to power these dictators caused war in Europe. Although 
America’s official plan was isolationism, we readily learned that in actual- 
iHaroldU. Faulkner, American Political and Social History (New fork, 
19U8), p. 150. 
2Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics 
(New Tork, 1956), p. 207. 
3xlbert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning of The American Doctrine 




ity we could not isolate ourselves from an industrious Europe. 
Now, systematic inter-party co-operation in dealing with foreign affairs 
started soon after the German attack on Poland in 1939* The opinion of 
unity, however, is not new and partisanship has often been condemned. James 
Madison, one of the authors of The Federalist states, "that public good is 
disregarded in the conflict of rival parties," that "measures are too often 
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor 
It 
party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. 
The political situation created by World War II and the memories of conflict 
between the President and Congress and between the Democratic and Republi¬ 
can parties in 1919 and 1920 over the Treaty of Versailles share responsi¬ 
bility for the contemporary effort to apply the Washington ideal of "unity 
of government" to international relations 
September 20, 1939, twenty days after the start of World War II, Presi¬ 
dent Roosevelt invited a nunfcer of Republican and Democratic leaders to 
the White House, where he asked them how he should overcome the reluctance 
of the Foreign Relations Committee to amend the Neutrality Act. Frank Knox, 
the Republican candidate for the Vice Presidency in 1936, declared, "we 
should forget all about political parties, close ranks, and prepare to de¬ 
fend our country."^ The next day in an address to a joint session of Con- 
\ . 
gress, President Roosevelt publicly launched the movement for inter-party 
ItEdward M. Earle (ed.), The Federalist. (New York, 1937), p. 5U. 
ïfelair Holies, "Bipartisanship In American Foreign Policy," Foreign 
Policy Reports, XXIV (January, 191*9)» p« 197* 
6James îÿmes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 19U7)» p. 8. 
10 
co-operation by saying "these perilous days demand co-operation between us 
7 
without a trace of partisanship." This is the birth of bipartisanship in 
American foreign policy toward Europe and it was influenced by the growing 
need of the United States to prepare to defend herself. Earlier, President 
Roosevelt had asked for advice and received a very partisan answer. This 
meeting occurred several weeks before the outbreak of war in Europe and 
took place in the President's study. Roosevelt and Bill told Vice President 
Gamer and Senator William E. Borah of their conviction that war might be 
averted by immediate amendment to the Neutrality Act. Senator Borah brushed 
Hull off by saying that his private sources of information assured him there 
would be no war; and Gamer ended the meeting by saying, cheerfully, to 
Roosevelts "Well, captain, we may as well face the facts. Tou haven't got 
Q 
the votes, and that's all there is to it. President Roosevelt did not for¬ 
get that afternoon's experience and before he asked for anything, he always 
made sure that he had the "votes." This particular experience may have 
caused Roosevelt to remember the problems of Woodrow Wilson following World 
War I. Perhaps, the ghost of Wilson was whispering to Roosevelt — to be 
partisan in foreign policy is to be weak, we may win the war, but could we 
gather the fruits of victory and harness the aims of peace through a parti¬ 
san foreign policy? 
A 
As Sherwood states, "as Roosevelt sat at the end of the long table in 
the cabinet room working on that speech 'the arsenal of democracy1 and 
other speeches during the war years, he would look up at the portrait of 
7Blair Bo lies, 0£. dt., p. 197. 
^Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins vol. 1 (New fork, 1950)»p. 133, 
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Woodrow Wilson, over the man tie piece. The tragedy of Wilson was always 
somewhere within the rim of his consciousness. Roosevelt could never for¬ 
get Wilson» s mistakes, which had been made with the noblest concept of the 
Christian ethic. Wilson had advocated 'peace without victory,* he had 
produced the Fourteen Points as a basis on which Germany could surrender 
honorably. The violation of these principles had plagued the postwar 
world, had led to the rise of Hitler and a Second World War, and there was 
no motivating force in all of Roosevelt* B wartime political policy stronger 
o 
than the determination to prevent repetition of the same mistakes .* The 
birth of bipartisanship was a great process in American foreign policy. 
It was to aid American war and peace efforts. 
Political leaders were greatly concerned with the origin of bipartisan¬ 
ship. This new process was virtually a revolution in American foreign 
policy towards Europe, Forged by the threats of war and made to live in 
actuality by that war, bipartisanship raised several questions concerning 
its practicality, validity, and prospects. Politicians wanted to know if 
bipartisanship would work. Gould there be enough unity between Capitol 
Hill and the White House and between the major political parties to make it 
. 10 
work7 Another question concerning its practicality vast Can American 
foreign policy be separated from American domestic policy that there can 
be unity in one Held, while there is conflict in the other? The validity 
of bipartisanship was also questioned. Is this unity, in fact, anything 
9lbid., p. 227. 
3-OHOIHS W. Barber, Foreign Policies of The United States (New York, 
1953), p. Ut. 
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more than a temporary expedient which is likely to disappear whenever there 
is the normal position of a President with Congress behind him? The pro¬ 
spects of bipartisanship raised several questions which were to be answered 
only by history. Some of these questions a ret Are there forces at work in 
the making of American foreign policy which permit the assumption that a 
bipartisan policy will continue Independently of the President’s relation 
to Congress? Does this assumption depend upon the decision by America to 
play an active role in world affairs? Does it depend on the continuance 
of a crisis situation? How far does it depend upon the personality of the 
President? Could he, for example, be in a minority in Congress, and yet 
secure such popular support for his policy as to compel the majority to 
aoPept it? 
These questions emerged with the origin of bipartisanship. However, 
we must adbdt that while bipartisanship and isolationism are compatible, 
bipartisanship in American foreign policy grew out of isolationism and did, 
in many instances, destroy isolationist policies toward Europe. Bipartisan¬ 
ship allowed America to participate in European affairs; it was possible 
for America to speak in Europe with popular support at home. 
Consequently, bipartisanship, according to one writer, bas several ad¬ 
vantages. First, its purpose is to strengthen American security and sus¬ 
tain American ideals by giving maximum authority to America’s voice fbr 
peace with justice. Second, it permits our democracy to speak with a great 
decree. Third, it leaves us Dree to change our national administration 
without affecting the continuity of our fbrelgn policyThis does not 
^■Gordon Morton, and S. N. Vines, Theory and Practice of American 
Foreign Policy (New York, 1955), p. 30SI 
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mean that vs cease to be Democrats or Republicans, it does not mean that 
we mute our criticisms of mistakes. It does not mean a fake * unity* de¬ 
void of popular consent. It means that ve strive by consultation to lift 
foreign policy above partisan issues. with the above words of Senator 
Vandenberg, ve move to the evolution of bipartisanship and some of its 
criticisms. 
l^Arthur H. Vandenberg, "Bipartisan Ibreign Policy," Vital Speeches. 
October 15, 19U8, p. 60u^ 
CHAP 1ER HI 
OHE EVOUJTEON AND CRITICISMS OF BIPARTISANSHIP 
Tha evolution of bipartisanship in American foreign policy is, for this 
study, primarily concerned with two particular phases or periods. The first 
phase is that of basic theoretical formulations in regard to bi-partisan¬ 
ship. This is the period in which ideas are fonneled into a vague framework. 
It is a period, too, in which politicians are, perhaps, beginning to see 
through the dark glass of partisanship in foreign policy and envisioning 
a bipartisan foreign policy. The second phase of bipartisanship is concern¬ 
ed with practical application. This phase, therefore, witnesses some prac¬ 
tical aspects of bipartisanship and some of its prospects* 
Many significant events transpired during the fondamental theoretical 
phase of bipartisanship. First, there was the outburst of war on the 
European Continent in 1939* This conflict, which may have seemed distant 
to many Americans, was closer than many people conceived it to be. With 
German submarines in the seas and Hitler's mechanised armies ravaging the 
land, America soon realised that to lose the democracies on the European 
Continent mould leave the United States vulnerable to a German attack. 
Fear of war and finally war itself supported the United States in develop¬ 
ing a different foreign policy - bipartisanship. 
Bipartisanship, in its evolution, was discussed, debated, and given 
many names other than bipartisanship. President Roosevelt made hie first 
bipartisan appointments soon after announcing to Congress his ideas of 
such a policy. Perhaps to show opposition members that he was serious 
and to surround himself with able men, President Roosevelt appointed on 
June 20, 19U0, Frank Knox aa Secretary of the Navy and Henry L. Stimson, 
1U 
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Republican Secretary of War 1909-1913 and Republican Secretary of State, 
1929-1933, as his Secretary of War.'*' It vas some time before any other 
opposition members were appointed to key positions. There must be time 
fbr the country to reconcile itself to this new process and time for polit¬ 
ical adjustment. 
Meanwhile, the presidential election campaign of 19U0 began to prepare 
the country for acceptance of bipartisanship in foreign policy. Wilkie 
was the candidate on the Republican ticket and F. D. Roosevelt was the 
candidate on the Democratic ticket. The too candidates agreed fundamental¬ 
ly on the attitude which the United States should take towards the war in 
Europe. In his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination on August 17, 
19U0, Wilkie states that he was for "peace for the United States as long 
as possible but not at the expense of either an Axis victory or a stalemate." 
In fact, before his nomination, Wilkie recomnended aid to those nations 
2 
fighting Germany. However, during the campaign and at the urging of Re¬ 
publican party members, Wilkie did attack the fbreign policy of Roosevelt. 
The Republican professionals begged Wilkie to abandon the principle of 
bipartisanship, to attack Roosevelt as a "war-monger," and to warn the 
American people that votes for Roosevelt meant wooden crosses fbr their 
sons and brothers and sweethearts,^ This was during the infancy of biparti¬ 
sanship. Nevertheless, on Lincoln’s Birthday, 19U2 Wilkie urged the Repub¬ 
lican party to abandon isolationism and on April 30, 19U2 the Republican 
iBlair Bo lies, "Bipartisanship In American Foreign Policy," Foreign 
Policy Reports. XXIV (January, 19h9), p. 193. 
2lbid., p. 193. 
3Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins vol. 1 (New York, 1950), 
p. 187. 
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National Committee accepted an anti-isolationist resolution proposed by 
Wilkie.^ President Roosevelt, it has been said, was "profoundly and eternal¬ 
ly grateful for Willde’s persistent battle against the isolationism of the 
Old Guard in the Republican Party.Wilkie and Roosevelt agreed not be¬ 
cause they had conferred bit because, independently, they had reached the 
same general conclusions. 
Early during Wbrld War H America commenced to think of the peace once 
the enemy surrendered. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, began to encourage 
inter-party co-operation in order to make certain that the United States 
would associate itself actively with other nations in an organization for 
keeping the peace once the war was over. Hull thought that the outcome of 
the Versailles struggle turned on party spirit and personal hostility and 
not on disagreement over substances. The anti-Versailles Republicans, 
according to Hull, "created a veritable organization to fight Wilson by 
fighting the League.*^ Consequently, it seemed that a future for inter¬ 
party co-operation was already in the making. Bipartisanship was to help 
the United States avoid the errors of 1919-1920, and to strengthen this 
prospect President Roosevelt created an Advisory Committee on Postwar 
ïbreign Policy.' Then, too, the election campaign of 19hk was one in which 
agreement was reached between Dewey and Roosevelt not to make a campaign 
issue of the future peace. Dewey did not attack the conduct of the war. 
b*CDP National Committee Accepts Anti-Isolationist Resolution," New 
York Times, February 13, 19U3> P* 2. 
5Blair Bolles, o£. dt.. p. 193. 
^Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hullt A Biography. (New York, 19U2), p. 16U. 
7Blair Bolles, og. dt.. p. 193. 
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Moreover, he did not try to exploit the situation when someone, apparent¬ 
ly in the aimed services informed him that the United States had broken 
the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor. Perhaps a major campaign issue 
could have been developed from this infbxmation. However, Dewey did not 
use this information, and continued to attack the administration as a group 
of "tired old men."8 Dewey, in refusing to attack the foreign policy of the 
administration, was following the bipartisan trend. This, perhaps, served 
farther to strengthen and unite the major political parties in the execu¬ 
tion of the war. 
On Capitol Hill there was much discussion concerning bipartisanship. 
It was severely criticised, but it was accepted by a majority of the mem¬ 
bers of the minority party. However, it seems that the turning-point for 
inter-party co-operation on Capitol Hill occurred when Senator Vandenberg 
saw clearly the need for bipartisanship in foreign policy. In the Spring 
of 19hi he was becoming convinced that unity was essential in the face of 
the world crisis and in November of 191(1 he wrote in his diary, "It is dan¬ 
gerous to lump all of us into one standard bracket....If I had to choose 
between being an isolationist or an internationalist, I should unhesitating¬ 
ly proclaim myself to be the former. But the path of wisdom and prudence 
9 
lies somewhere between.** By April, 19b2, Vandenberg had clearly repudiated 
isolationism^® and later took a film stand for bipartisanship. During the 
Yalta Conference Roosevelt instructed Stettinius, who had succeeded Hull as 
^Robert E. Sherwood, o£. cit., pp. 820-627. 
^Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg 
(Boston, 1952), pp. 12-15. 
IQEbld., p. 162. 
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Secretary of State, to name Vandenberg to the delegation of the United 
States which would open in San Francisco on April 25, fbr the purpose of 
moulding a permanent international organization out of the decisions and 
disagreements of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference*^ Concerning the Vandenberg 
appointment Roosevelt stated that "Wilson lost his great Ught for the 
League of Nations because he did not take with him, to the Versailles Peace 
12 Conference, at least one Republican Senator.* With the appointment of 
Vandenberg ends, it appears, the period of theoretical bipartisanship and 
originates the second phase of bipartisanship in practice. 
A large portion of the record of the United States in international 
relations since 19U5 is the fruit of the bipartisan system. In consider¬ 
ing some of the fruits of a bipartisan system we are primarily concerned 
with several programs* First there is the consideration of conferences 
and proposals during -die war, one of whose main objective was to strength* 
en the role of the United States in peacetime affairs. In general, these 
proposals were also set forth to insure America* s participation in an 
international organization fbr the maintenance of peace and security through¬ 
out the world. Secondly, there is the consideration of economic proposals 
whose purpose was to aid some of the devastated European countries and 
thereby contain the spread of communism* Thirdly, there is the continuance 
of the practice of appointing party members to key positions and to key 
conferences. 
During the War the United States participated in programs fbr the peace. 
H-Blair Bo lies, oj>. cit., p. 193* 
^Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 19U6), p. 3U0* 
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These programs were centered around the establishment of an international 
organization for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the 
world. The first of such programs was the United Nations Declaration of 
January 1} 19 U2; this represented a reversal by America in foreign policy. 
Belbre our entry into World War H President Boosevelt had felt that pub¬ 
lic opinion would not allow America to participate in such a program. In 
October, 19U3, Secretary of State Cordell Hull traveled to Moscow to attend 
a meeting of fbreign ministers. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss 
problems of war and peace, "Tie foreign ministers agreed to "recognize the 
necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general inter¬ 
national organization based on the principles of sovereign equality for 
all peace-loving states, large and small, fbr the maintenance of internation¬ 
al peace and security.^ These two conferences paved the way for the Dum¬ 
barton Oaks meeting of August, 19UU,and subsequently, for the San Francisco 
Conference of April 25-June 26, 19U5. However, it seems, it was the San 
Francisco Conference;where 'the bipartisan practice of appointing minority 
members to key conferences begins. The purpose of the San Francise» Con¬ 
ference, according to one writer, was to mould a permanent international 
organization out of the decisions and disagreements of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference.^* The United States delegation to the San Francisco Confer¬ 
ence was a bipartisan group composed of Secretary of State- Stettinius, 
Cordell Hull, Senator Tom Connally, Senator Vandenberg, Representative Bloom, 
Representative Eaton, Harold Stassen- former Republican Governor of Minne* 
13Richard C. Snyder and Edgar J. Fumiss Jr., American Fbrelgi Policy 
(New York, 1955), pp. 789-790. 
l%lair Bo 11 es, o£. cit.. p. 195- 
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so ta j and Miss Virginia Glldersleeve- Sean of Barnard College.^* It «as 
generally felt that the United Mations Charter, «hich vas an outgrowth of 
the San Francisco Conference and which establishes the conditions fbr the 
existence of the United Nations, would be ratified by the United States 
Senate.^ This feeling was widespread because America had earlier express¬ 
ed such opinion in the FUlbrtght Resolution, September 21, 19ii3, "Resolved 
by the House of Representatives, that the Congress hereby expresses itself 
as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power 
adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the 
nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States 
therein through its constitutional processes." Moreover, there was the 
Connally Resolution of November 5* 191*3» which states "that the war against 
all our enemies be waged until complete victory is achieved»•■•That the 
Senate recogiizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest 
practicable date a general international organisation, based on the princi¬ 
ples of the soverelgi equality of all peace-loving states, and open to mem» 
bership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of inter¬ 
national peace and security.»^ These two resolutions placed the United 
States on record as favoring an international organisation for maintain¬ 
ing peace and security. On July 28, 19l*5,the United States Senate ratified 
l^Benjamin Wiliams, "Bipartisanship In American Foreign Policy," The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 2$9 
(September, i91*&), 139» J 
lèvera M. Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York, 19U5),p. 101. 
ITünlted States Department of State Publication 1*21*5» In Quest of Peace 
and Security. General Foreign Policy Series 53» October, 1951» pp. 5-4» 
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the United Nations Charter by a bipartisan vote of 89-2, consequently, it 
«as the Seventy-Ninth Congress which made it possible for America to par¬ 
ticipate in a world organization upon which rests much of the hope of man¬ 
kind for the achievement of international peace and security. 
Hie establishment of the United Nations was not a panacea. The end of 
World War U brought many problems to the forefront of America foreign pol¬ 
icy. Peace treaties had to be negotiated, war criminals tried, displaced 
persons taken care of, and aid to devastated countries administered. More¬ 
over, we will be concerned with that phase of our foreign policy which 
acted to contain Russian Communism through its economic aid to some of the 
European countries. Hie first of such programs is the Truman Doctrine. 
It was more than an economic aid program to help Greece and Turkey, it also 
was the result of bipartisanship and above all it was a bold defiance of 
Russian Communism. On March 12, 19U7, President Truman appeared before 
a joint session of Congress and called for American assistance to "support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation." He asked Congress 
for an initial grant of $1*00,000,000 in economic and armed aid, the bulk 
of it for Greece. The Truman Doctrine was to undergo some changes before 
its enactment. The primary argument against this program was that the 
United States was acting outside the United Nations Charter. After two 
weeks of debate and constant urging by Senator Vandenberg, the United 
Nations Security Council was notified formally of America's action — "the 
program of économie assistance contemplated by the United States is of an 
emergency and temporary character. The United States believes that the 
United Nations and its agencies should assume the principal responsibility, 
within their capabilities, for the long-ranged tasks of assistance required 
22 
for the recons traction of Greece... «the United States is giving momentum 
l8 
to the United Nations by its present policy. ..•* This did not satisfy 
Senator Vanderberg. Re felt that this program could be brought directly 
in line with Charter objectives. Therefore, he drafted a new preamble 
to the bill; this not only brought the program within the framework of the 
Charter but the United Nations was given authority to terminate it through 
action of its own organ. Before enactment of the Truman Doctrine or Public 
Law 75f Senator Vandenberg and others had to defend this program many times.In 
April, 19U7^the Senate approved the bill and the Rouse had already approved 
it by a three-to-one majority. This was the first big victory in a Repub- 
19 lican controlled Congress for a bipartisan foreign policy. 
Another plan to aid European States and thwart the spread of communism 
was the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program. In fact, Secretary 
Marshall had opened the subject for assistance to European countries as 
early as June 5, 19U7, in an address at Harvard University. Prom the 
speech the ideas for the Marshall Plan evolved as an economic aid program 
for Europe. On February 13» 191*8 * the Foreign Relations Committee approved 
the program by a bipartisan vote of 13-0 and on March ll*, 191*8,the Senate 
passed the Foreign Assistance Act by a vote of 69-17* This was another 
victory for bipartisanship. This program, like that of the Truman Doctrine, 
became law in a Republican controlled Congress with a Democratic adminis- 
tration. These two bills represent great strides for bipartisanship; 
lÔArthur H. Vandenberg, oj>. cit., p. 3U1. 
^Arthur H. Vandenberg, o£. cit., pp. 371*-389 
20ibid., pp. 373-398. 
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they were passed in a Republican Congress and above all the chairman of 
the Fbreign Relations Committee, who was a Republican, fought for these 
hills to uphold the bipartisan practice of stopping politics *at the water 
edge.* Then, too, these bills represent American leadership in thwarting 
communism. 
America* s participation in economic recovery was great. However, to 
strengthen its economic participation and to aid in containing communism 
the United States needed a military program. Such a proposal was the 
Vandenberg Resolution} it encouraged the Executive to proceed to the "pro¬ 
gressive development of regional and other collective self-defense in 
accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the United 
States Charter. Association of the United States, by* constitutional pro¬ 
cess, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based 
on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its 
national security.* in approving the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 
191*8, by a vote of 6U-6, the Senate went on record as agreeing in advance 
to the entrance of the United States into military alliances. Ibis, in 
effect, smoothed the way for extending the strategy of containment beyond 
reliance on economic means.^ 
While these various programs were being instituted, the administration 
continued the bipartisan practice of appointing opposition party members 
to key posit!cns and to key conferences, first, there were those Congress¬ 
men who were active in shaping a bipartisan foreign policy and especially 
21william Reitzel, et. al.. United States fb reign Policy» 19U5-1955 
(Washington, D. C., 19557* P» 1231 
22tbid.. p. 127. 
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after the 191*6 election when the Republican Party gained a majority in Con¬ 
gress and Senator Vandenberg became chairman of the ïbreign Relations Com¬ 
mittee. It is generally agreed that because of his leadership in the Senate, 
bipartisanship did not die; instead, Senator Vandenberg* 8 leadership furnish¬ 
ed a key to bipartisanship. At no time during his chairmanship of the Pbr- 
eign Relations Committee was there a Republican administration and yet, for 
every proposal and program set forth by the administration, pertaining to 
European affairs, he fought unyielding for it. Other Republicans to be ap¬ 
pointed to key conferences by the administration included — John Foster 
Dulles, Representative Bloom, Representative Eaton, Senator W. A. Austin 
and Harold Stassen. The Eightieth Congress was proclaimed by Présidait 
Truman to be the worse Congress, yet this Congress enacted 69 bills relat¬ 
ing to foreign affairs for his administration.^ 
Despite the institution of the various economic and military programs, 
bipartisanship did seem to diminish. Ibis seemed particularly true in the 
191*8 presidential campaign. Dewey was running again on the Republican 
ticket and Harry S. Truman was running on the Democratic ticket. Foreign 
policy issues were brought into this campaign. Dewey charged that, "the 
administration did not seem to understand the nature of the communist 
threat* and that "the administration had made tragic concessions in many 
areas of the world. In more than three yean the Soviet Union has extend¬ 
ed its sway around the world and now rules more than five million human 
2Jw 
beings." President Truman attacked the Eightieth Congress as being the 
23office of the Co-Ordinator of Information, Eightieth Congress Legis¬ 
lation, House of Representatives, July 15, 191*8, pp. 32-39. 
2l**»Dewey Declares Truman’s Policies Helpfil to Soviets," New York Times, 
October 28, 191*8, p. 1. 
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"worss Congress in history.*^ However, it seems, that in making his 
charges against Congress, President Truman did not make a distinction 
between domestic and foreign policy.^ 
While the two candidates were debating foreign policy issues there were 
efforts on Capitol Hill to strengthen bipartisanship and to take it out of 
the campaign to avoid commitments and to avoid prejudicing America' s position 
at the United Nations. Of course Dewey refused because "the President does 
27 not wholly divorce himself from the foreign policy issue." 
Moreover, the year 19b9 was one of tremendous political change. With 
a Democratic victory the Republicans lost control of the Senate; Senator 
Vandenberg retired as chairman of the ïbreign Relations Committee. This 
year, 19U9, brought the first defeat to an administration foreign policy 
program. Congress failed to sustain Truman's $1,1*50,000,000 program to 
help arm Western Europe. Instead by a vote of 238-112 Congress authorized 
a one year program at a cost of $869,505,000; thus aid for Western Europe 
was cut in half. Ibis was Truman's first defeat of consequence in the 
area of foreign policy. It is also the first time bipartisan support of 
a measure to contain Russian Communism has collapsed.nils led many 
people to believe that bipartisanship was dead. They listed reasons of the 
death of bipartisanship as - a growing sentiment for economy, easing tension 
in East-West relations, a spreading skepticism about Europe's willingness 
25Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr., o£. cit., p. Ub9. 
26ibid.. p. UU8. 
271bid.. p. Uhl, 
28*ibe Bipartisan Honeymoon Is Over," Newsweek, August 29, 19b9, p. 13» 
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and ability to organize for a common defense, enthusiasm about air power 
and the atom bomb as the really reliable implement of the United States 
and the world against Soviet aggression, and apparent indifference of 
the public — many congressmen had not received a single letter in favor of 
29 aras aid. 
While it seemed that bipartisanship was declining, there were attempts 
to strengthen it. A special subcommittee of the House Fbreign Affairs Com¬ 
mittee urged that the proposed International Trade Organization be support- 
« 30 ed by the 81st Congress as part of bipartisan foreign policy, in a report 
by the foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Hoover Commission on Organiza¬ 
tion of the Executive Branch of the government urged Présidait Truman to 
fora an "executive secretariat* to help formulate and coordinate the foreign 
and domestic policies of the nation. This report called for overall improve¬ 
ment in the areas of formulating and executing foreign policy. It was to 
be a liaison between the administration and Congress.^ 
Now, by 1950, bipartisanship was, perhaps, at its lowest level. Sev¬ 
eral events, in general, were responsible fbr this. First, the 19U8 pres¬ 
idential campaign was one in which' no agreement was reached on foreign 
policy. The two candidates, Dewey and Truman, made foreign policy a cam- 
paign issue. Secondly, the Democratic victory which took the majority 
away from the Republicans in the Senate created a situation where hiparti- 
29lbid., p. Hi. 
30*Bipartisan Stand Backing I1D Urged,* New York Times, October 28, 
19U8, p. 12. 
31*Hoover Group Asks Truman to Unify Home and Foreign Plans," New York 
Times, December 13, 19U8, p. 1. 
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sanship was not necessary. Thirdly, the retirement of Senator Vandenberg 
as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; it is surmised that 
around him developed the core of bipartisanship. Fourthly, the failure of 
Congress to sustain Truman's arms aid program for Western Europe. 
Moreover, rebellion within the Republican Party further weakened bipar¬ 
tisanship. It appears that they had gathered behind Senator Wherry in an 
effort to scrap bipartisanship. These Republicans claimed that the Demo¬ 
crats get credit for success while Republicans are dragged in on failures 
under the guise of bipartisanship. They also wanted "no more me-too-ism" 
in foreign polity; they felt that the voice'of the opposition made for " 
good politics Then, too, the Korean situation brought much criticism 
on the administration for not including the Far East in its bipartisan‘ 
foreign policy. Finally, the absence of Senator Vandenberg, because of 
illness, left a vast vacuum in the Senate. In a letter to Senator Vandenberg 
President Truman states, "you Just don’t realize what a vacuum there has 
been in the Senate and in the operation of foreign policy since you left.... 
I am sincerely hoping that you will recover completely and have an oppor¬ 
tunity to train some of tie young men in the Senate who are anxious to 
carry on with what you, Cordell Hull and other Secretaries of State visual¬ 
ized with regard to a continuing foreign policy for this great Government 
of ours."^ 
There is much criticism of bipartisanship. First, many Congressional 
32«Grinding An Old Axe," The Commonweal, January 13, 1950, p. 379* 
33Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., oj>. cit., p. 5U2. 
3Ulbid., p. 560. 
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leaden never used the word "bipartisanship,* instead, such words..as Sun- 
partisan," and "bipartisan alibi" werenused. However, to argue this point 
is a Blatter of semantics since in finality they all mean virtually the same 
thing, unity in policy. Nonetheless, David Lawrence claims that there is 
no such thing as bipartisan fbreign policy, "there is no such thing as a 
bipartisan forei&i policy. What is needed is unpartisan approach....Re¬ 
publicans must refrain from asserting views merely for the sake of parti- 
canship but that Democrats, too, including the President in this instance, 
must refrain from seeking political credit at the polls for measures made 
possible by Republican votes in Congress.However, this is a different 
aspect. David Lawrence is suggesting the absence of political parties in 
foreign policy and not inter-party co-operation. 
Bipartisanship is also criticised because it emphasizes a distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs. Perhaps, this is one of the basic 
weaknesses of bipartisanship, since, domestic issues do affect foreign 
policy. The elimination of fbod rationing in 19hS temporarily reduced the 
quality of fbod available fbr shipment abroad from the United States. The 
rapid demobilization of our armed forces after the Japanese surrender put 
our military strength out of balance with our international obligations.^ 
This led many European people to think that while the United States had 
abandoned isolationism as a national policy, the majority of its people seem 
to cling to it as a habit of thinking.^ 
3î>David Lawrence, "Unpartisanship- Not Bipartisanship," U. S. News and 
World Report. April 17, 1950, p. 60. 
36siair Bolies, o£. clt.. pp. 196-197* 
37«our Policies Disturb and Puzzle Europe," New York Times, June 13, 
19U8, Section 6, p. 10. 
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Further, bipartisanship is criticized in that it has a limited terri¬ 
torial application, in that it did not include China and Japan. This as- 
<)û 
pect brings more criticism concerning the unity of bipartisanship. The 
basic question raised is, '’can there be a bipartisan foreign policy which 
is limited in its territorial application? It seems that the foreign policy 
of a sovereign state can be divided into many areas. If this is true, then 
certainly there can be a bipartisan policy for one area while another area 
is not included in a bipartisan policy. Of course, many critics will argue 
that a bipartisan foreign policy should embrace foreign policy of a state. 
This will lead many critics to assume that bipartisanship in American for¬ 
eign policy is a quasi-bipartisanship, that it is not genuine and is merely 
a blind for the administration to hide behind. It must be remembered, how¬ 
ever, that bipartisanship embraces not only areas of application but the 
voting scheme of the national legislature. However, in principle, biparti¬ 
sanship is not limited to any particular territorial application. 
CriticisnBof bipartisanship will continue but it is generally agreed 
that there are definite advantages in a bipartisan foreign policy. First, 
bipartisanship united our national political leaders in the execution of 
the war. Secondly, bipartisanship enabled America to participate in an 
international organization for maintaining peace and security. Thirdly, 
it aided the United States in presenting a unified foreign policy to deter 
the spread of communism. Insofar as Democrats and Republicans have trans¬ 
formed bipartisanship from a mere system of making foreign policy into the 
status of a specific attitude in foreign policy - to its supporters and 
detractors alike, it stands far above everything else, American defiance 
of the Soviet Union.^ 
38]31air Bo lies, o£. cit., p. 197 • 
39Blair Bolles, og. cit., p. 193. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMAHT AND CONCLUSION 
Bipartisanship in American foreign policy is an example of collabora¬ 
tion between the major political parties* As stated previously, foreign 
policy is the governmental conduct of the relations of one political sover¬ 
eignty with others.'1' The President of the United States is primarily re - 
sponsible for foreign policy and has broad power in this area. However, 
there are controls by which this authority is exercised; Congress does par- 
2 
ticipate in the foreign policy process* 
Moreover, the President of the United States has proclaimed broad for¬ 
eign policies* Washington, in his «Farewell Address," set the pattern for 
isolationism; it seems that many subsequent Presidents followed in his foot¬ 
steps, The "Monroe Doctrine" of 1823 and the "Good Neighbor" policy of 
F, D. Roosevelt, are but a few of the endless examples of foreign policies 
enunciated by Presidents* 
Undoubtedly, many definitions of bipartisanship are available* However, 
the bipartisanship in this study means interparty co-operation* Interparty 
co-operation may take many different forms; its definition is operational 
and takes form only when a certain process develops. Conceived thusly, hi- 
partisanship may be consultation between the party in control of the admin¬ 
istration and the opposing party* It may be appointment, by the administra- 
* 
tion party, of opposition party members to key committees and key conferences. 
«ï *. 
iFelix Morley, op. cit.. p. 7* 
2Article I, Section 8, gives Congress power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations* Article II, Section 2, gives the Senate power to ratify 
treaties and confirm the appointment of foreign service officers* 
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Finally, interparty co-operation nay be collaboration between the major 
political parties in the formulation and execution of foreign policy* 
For a long period, isolationism was America's official plan towards 
Europe* Bipartisanship originated because the war in Europe was threaten¬ 
ing to Involve the thited States* In the fall of 1939» President Roosevelt 
strove to amend the Neutrality Act of 1937* In so doing, he called upon 
Republican and Democratic party leaders for advice on the failure of the 
Foreign Relations Committee to amend the Neutrality Act* The next day, 
September 21, 1939» he publicly launched the movement for bipartisanship* 
In speaking before a joint session of Congress, Roosevelt called for co¬ 
operation without a trace of "partisanship." This may be said to be the 
birth of bipartisanship in American foreign policy* Undoubtedly, President 
Roosevelt was seeking to unify the country to meet the growing prospects of 
war* Perhaps, too, the ghost of Wilson was whispering to Roosevelt - to be 
partisan in foreign policy is to be weak* We may win the war but could we 
gather the fruits of victory and harness the aims of peace through a parti¬ 
san foreign policy? Bipartisanship unified , in a measure, American war 
and peace efforts* 
In an effort to evaluate bipartisanship, several questions are raised* 
To what extent has our bipartisan foreign policy been adhered to? In its 
evolution, interparty co-operation reflects adherence to the principles of 
consultation, exclusion of certain issues from presidential campaigns, 
appointment of opposition party members to key conferences, and collabora¬ 
tion between the two major political parties in enacting certain foreign 
policy measures* 
In its evolution are several exanples of consultation. It seems that 
32 
consultation means agreement before the enunciation of certain foreign 
policies. This does not eliminate debate before agreement. However it 
does minimize public criticism of certain foreign policies. It also seems 
that appointment of opposition party members to policy-making conferences 
and delegations constitutes, in a sense, consultation. There was consul¬ 
tation between Republicans and Democrats in the execution of the "Truman 
Doctrine." However, Senator Vandenberg claimed that President Truman only 
cursorily consulted him before enunciation of the program. This may have 
occurred because of the emergency at hand. Nonetheless, enactment of the 
"Truman Doctrine" reflects the bipartisan attitude. The "Marshall Plan* is 
another example of consultation and the Vandenberg Resolution also is an 
example of consultation. The appointment of opposition party members to 
policy-making conferences and delegation, such as the Dumbarton Oaks Confer¬ 
ence and the San Francisco Conference, do, to a degree, constitute consul¬ 
tation.'Nevertheless, one writer feels that consultation has been adhered 
to only when foreign policy must be legislated and not when it depends 
3 
solely on the President. 
The presidential campaigns of 19U0, 19lilt, and 19 U8 also show that the 
elimination of foreign policy issues from attack was not consistent. In 
the 19li0 campaign, Wilkie did attack the foreign policy of President 
Roosevelt. The 19Ui presidential campaign is significant in that foreign 
, policy was not a campaign issue. This campaign, however, was at the height 
of Wbrld War II. Moreover, the 19U8 presidential campaign involved foreign 
policy. Dewey attacked the Truman administration as being responsible fbr Soviet 
3Blair Bolles, o£. cdt., p. 195. 
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encirclement of certain eastern European countries. And the 1952 presiden¬ 
tial campaign resulted in a bitter foreign policy struggle over the Korean 
situation. 
Meanwhile, the appointment of opposition party members to policy-making 
conferences and delegations has not been consistent either. From 19UO to 
19i*8, Republicans were represented on virtually every key conference and 
delegation. Then from 19U8 to 1950, the system seamed to have collapsed.^ 
In general, collaboration between the parties in enacting foreign policy 
legislation has been virtually consistent. The United Hâtions Charter 89 
to 2, the Marshall Plan 167-17, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 61-5, and 
the Vandenberg Resolution 6JU—6, are some examples of collaboration. All in 
all, interparty co-operation has been loosely applied. Ibis does not mean 
that bipartisanship is a myth; instead, it show that interparty co-oper¬ 
ation has not been consistent. Tet, considering weak party discipline in 
Congress, the above examples represent great co-operation in foreign policy. 
Considering the evolution of bipartisanship, there is no evidence to 
demonstrate conclusively that interparty co-operation is or is not a tempor¬ 
ary expedient. Hor can the extent to which certain factors influence bi¬ 
partisanship be determined. Some of the factors which might influence 
interparty co-operation are* national emergencies, the personality and 
dkill of the President in manipulating members of the opposition party, 
personalities like Vandenberg, George, or Taft, and the party in control 
of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
How, concerning the validity of the principle of bipartisanship, we 
^Richard C. Snyder and EdgarS. Furniss, Jr., o£. dt., p. 503. 
3U 
refer to the words of Senator Vandenberg7 "Bipartisanship does not mean 
that we mute our criticisms of mistakes) it does not mean a fake 'unity* 
devoid of popular consent. It does mean that we strive by consultation to 
lift foreign policy above partisan issue. Consequently) unity of thought 
and action may not be necessary or desirable. Another writer states that) 
"Its purpose is not to eliminate public discussion or criticism in demo- 
6 
cratic debate." 
The ultimate question of the validity of foreign policy must be answer» 
ed in terms of the ends-in-view, that is, the objective. Put differently, 
it is a question of values and valuation. If a fundamental measure of 
unity of thought and action in foreign policy is valid and desirable, then 
bipartisanship is valid and desirable. By the same token, if consultation, 
collaboration, the elimination of lb reign policy issues from the heat of 
political campaigns, and the appointment of opposition member's to key con¬ 
ferences and delegations contribute to the fulfillment of the aforemention¬ 
ed objective, they, too, are valid and desirable. On the other hand, if 
the validity of the objective be denied, then the validity of the principle 
of bipartisanship must be denied. 
The primary advantage of our bipartisan approach in foreign policy has 
been unity. Through interpàrty co-operation, the United States has been 
able to present to the world a unified foreign policy with much popular sup» 
5A. H. Vandenberg, "Bipartisan Foreign Policy," Vital Speeches .October 
15, 19U8, p. 60. 
^Benjamin Cohen, "The Evolving Bole of Congress in Foreign Affhirs," 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, October 25, 19U8, p. 215, 
quoted in R. C. Snyder and E. S. Fumiss, Jr., oj>. eft., p. 507* 
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port at heme. This unity in foreign policy aided America in executing 
the war; it aided America in seeking to contain the spread of Russian 
Communism. The prospects for our bipartisan approach are not too hopeful. 
The 1952 Presidential Campaign resulted in a bitter struggle concerning 
foreign policy towards the Ear East, especially, Korea and China. It seems 
that bipartisanship had collapsed. And even today, Arthur Knock feels 
7 
that interparty co-operation has been deserted. This may lead critics 
of bipartisanship to conclude that it depends on a crisis situation. Whether 
this is true or not, we cannot say; bipartisanship did, however, flourish 
during the war and the critical period after the war. Since the end of 
World War H, there have been some critical periods in which interparty 
co-operation did not appear to flourish. But then, too, the "Cold War" 
is a constant crisis situation. 
In conclusion, it appears that interparty co-operation was practical 
and valid in that it did bring together our national political leaders 
in the formation and execution of such programs as the "Truman Doctrine," 
and the "Marshall Plan." They were also unified in such proposals as the 
Fulbright and Connally Resolutions, the ratification of the United Nations 
Charter and the Vandenberg Resolution. 
7"White House Accused of Deserting Friends," New York Times, June 15, 
1958, faction E, p. 3» 
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